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FROM CYBER ATTACKS TO SOCIAL MEDIA 
REVOLUTIONS: ADAPTING LEGAL FRAMEWORKS TO THE 
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES OF NEW 
TECHNOLOGY 
Kristen E. Tullos∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
In June 2010, a security firm in Belarus detected a new cyber worm on a 
client’s computer in Iran.1 As experts worked to untangle its pieces and 
understand its purpose, they quickly realized that the worm, called Stuxnet, 
was one of the most sophisticated and expensive pieces of malware ever 
created.2 Over time, a consensus formed around its target: the centrifuges in 
Natanz, an Iranian nuclear facility.3 While it was not the first piece of malware 
intended to harm industrial systems, the design was so advanced that the worm 
could stealthily alter its target without continued human involvement.4 
Numerous investigations have suggested that Stuxnet was a joint American–
Israeli program.5 
Although the United States has yet to officially acknowledge responsibility 
for Stuxnet, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 
included provisions authorizing the military to conduct offensive operations in 
cyberspace.6 The United States is not alone in its acknowledgement of cyber as 
an offensive military tool; the fifteen countries with the largest military 
budgets are increasing their offensive cyber capabilities.7 The United States 
has also expanded its defensive cyber capabilities, as it frequently experiences 
 
 ∗ J.D., Emory University School of Law (2012); B.A., University of Georgia (2009).  
 1 Michael Joseph Gross, A Declaration of Cyber-War, VANITY FAIR, April 2011, at 152, 152, 155. 
 2 Id. at 158. 
 3 Id. at 159, 196. 
 4 Id. at 158–59. Journalist Michael Joseph Gross explains it more eloquently: “Stuxnet is like a self-
directed stealth drone: the first known virus that, released into the wild, can seek out a specific target, sabotage 
it, and hide both its existence and its effects until after the damage is done.” Id. at 159. 
 5 Ellen Nakashima & Joby Warrick, Official Say U.S., Israel Were Behind Cyberattack on Iran, WASH. 
POST, June 2, 2012, at A2. 
 6 Id.; National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 954, 125 Stat. 
1298, 1551 (2011). 
 7 Editorial, A New Kind of Warfare, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2012, at A24. 
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cyberattacks conducted by state and non-state actors.8 According to Keith B. 
Alexander, Director of the National Security Agency and Commander of U.S. 
Cyber Command, computer attacks by criminal gangs, hackers, and other 
nations on American infrastructure increased seventeen-fold between 2009 and 
2011.9 Cyber is undoubtedly an important part of the military toolkit, but what 
legal frameworks govern its use? 
Six months after the discovery of Stuxnet, a fruit vendor in Tunisia named 
Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire to protest the confiscation of his goods 
and harassment by local officials.10 Like many young people, Ms. Ben Mhenni, 
a Tunsian blogger and activist, reported what she could find out about the 
incident on her blog, Facebook page, and Twitter account.11 Despite the 
official media blackout, protesters used social media to rapidly disseminate 
information about events on the ground.12 On January 14, the day that former 
President Ben Ali fled the country, people around the world were tweeting at a 
rate of twenty-eight tweets per second about the situation in Tunisia.13 Despite 
the flurry of social media activity, Mhenni believes that “[s]ocial media didn’t 
start the revolution. It was just a tool that helped.”14 
The Internet has drastically expanded opportunities for sharing ideas and 
information, while at the same time making governments, businesses, and 
individuals more vulnerable to harm. As new technologies become widely-
available and increasingly sophisticated, the stakes only get higher. It is 
essential that the international community agree on a set of rules or norms to 
govern Internet activities. The Emory International Law Review’s Spring 2012 
Symposium, “International Law and the Internet: Adapting Legal Frameworks 
in Response to Online Warfare and Revolutions Fueled by Social Media” took 
on this challenge, exploring two key areas at the intersection of the Internet 
and international law. 
On February 1, 2012, the Symposium convened scholars and practitioners 
to discuss how to adapt international and domestic law to the challenges 
 
 8 David E. Sanger & Eric Schmitt, Rise Is Seen in Cyberattacks Targeting U.S. Infrastructure, N.Y. 
Times, July 27, 2012, at A8. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Rania Abouzeid, Postcard: Sidi Bouzid, TIME, Feb. 7, 2011, at 8, 8. 
 11 Kristen McTighe, A Blogger at Arab Spring’s Genesis, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2011, http://www. 
nytimes.com/2011/10/13/world/africa/a-blogger-at-arab-springs-genesis.html. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Alexia Tsotsis, A Twitter Snapshot of the Tunisian Revolution: Over 196K Mentions of Tunisia, 
Reaching Over 26M Users, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 16, 2011), http://techcrunch.com/2011/01/16/tunisia-2/. 
 14 McTighe, supra note 11. 
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presented by the Internet. Two main themes were featured in the day-long 
event. First, the Symposium considered how governments should respond to 
the changing nature of communication, particularly how it affects democratic 
governance and facilitates revolutionary movements. Second, it highlighted the 
challenges in applying jus in bello and jus ad bellum frameworks to the new 
landscape of cyberwarfare. Throughout the day, speakers discussing both 
topics considered whether existing legal frameworks are sufficient, or if a new 
body of law is needed to address challenges presented by the Internet. 
I. DEMOCRATIZATION OF COMMUNICATION 
Social media has changed the way societies organize by providing a fast 
and inexpensive way to transmit messages to a wide audience. Sascha 
Meinrath, Director of the New America Foundation’s Open Technology 
Initiative, discussed how the Internet is empowering people to undermine local 
laws that they believe are wrong, thereby causing democracy itself to evolve 
and become more direct and participatory.15 He advocated for greater Internet 
freedom to advance Article 19 of the United Nations Declaration of Human 
Rights, which provides that “everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression,” including the right to “receive and impart information and ideas 
through any media and regardless of frontiers.”16 
Currently, the freedom to share information online is not without 
constraints. Providers of online content are subject to laws of the countries 
where they operate.17 While there are extreme examples, such as Pakistan 
blocking Twitter in its entirety, other laws restrict certain content, like 
Germany’s ban on communications denying the holocaust.18 Websites 
operating in countries with severe restrictions are often faced with a difficult 
 
 15 Sascha Meinrath, Dir., Open Tech. Inst., New Am. Found., Panel Discussion at the Emory 
International Law Review Symposium: International Law and the Internet (Feb. 1, 2012), available at http:// 
youtu.be/jwO7yKFAprM. 
 16 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 19, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) 
(Dec. 10, 1948); see also Sascha Meinrath & Marvin Ammori, Internet Freedom and the Role of an Informed 
Citizenry at the Dawn of the Information Age, 26 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 921 (2012). 
 17 Ryan Hal Budish, Click to Change: Optimism Despite Online Activism’s Unmet Expectations, 26 
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 745 (2012). 
 18 See id. at 745; Jeffrey Rosen, Google’s Gatekeepers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2008, § 6 (Magazine), at 
50, 53. 
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choice: is it better to subject themselves to the regulations or protest by 
withdrawing from the country entirely?19 
Ramnath Chellappa, Associate Professor at Emory University’s Goizueta 
Business School, brought up the impact of online piracy on the music industry, 
as well as role of intellectual property laws in encouraging innovation.20 It can 
be difficult to find the right balance of Internet freedom and regulation, and 
this debate came to the forefront recently in the United States following the 
proposal of the Stop Online Piracy Act (“SOPA”) and the Protect IP Act 
(“PIPA”).21 After a massive opposition movement, led by large online 
companies like Google, Craigslist, and Wikipedia, the bills were defeated.22 
Meinrath believes that current copyright law does not comport with what 
people perceive as just. He characterizes the recent battles over SOPA and 
PIPA as the first round of many in the fight between free speech advocates and 
commercial interests in the United States.23 Ryan Hal Budish, Fellow at the 
Berkman Center for Internet & Society, suggested that ensuring transparency 
should be the first step in determining what state regulation is appropriate.24 
We should understand what websites are being restricted by which countries 
and engage in broad dialog before reaching any normative conclusions.25 
Control over Internet content is an important issue, especially as an 
increasing number of people are turning to the Internet for information.26 The 
Pew Research Center reported that between 2010 and 2012, the number of 
Americans who viewed the news on a social media site doubled.27 Although 
sites like Twitter and Facebook are not the main force underlying societal 
change, they do play an important role in rapidly disseminating information. 
 
 19 See Ryan Hal Budish, Fellow, Berkman Ctr. for Internet & Soc’y, Panel Discussion at the Emory 
International Law Review Symposium: International Law and the Internet (Feb. 1, 2012), http://youtu.be/jwO7 
yKFAprM. 
 20 Ramnath Chellappa, Assoc. Prof., Goizueta Bus. Sch., Panel Discussion at the Emory International 
Law Review Symposium: International Law and the Internet (Feb. 1, 2012), http://youtu.be/jwO7yKFAprM. 
 21 Jenna Wortham, With Twitter, Blackouts and Demonstrations, Web Flexes Its Muscle, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 19, 2012, at B1. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Meinrath, supra note 15. 
 24 Budish, supra note 19. 
 25 Id. 
 26 In Changing News Landscape, Even Television is Vulnerable: Trends in News Consumption: 1991–
2012, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 27, 2012), http://www.people-press.org/2012/09/27/in-changing-news-landscape-
even-television-is-vulnerable/. 
 27 Id. 
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As Meinrath put it, social media is “not the driver, but the lens through which 
the rest of the world can view it.”28 
Online activism is playing an important role in social movements 
worldwide, but it is not a substitute for traditional activism.29 While traditional 
activism demands commitment and can be intimidating to outsiders; online 
activism usually requires less investment, and is sometimes called “armchair 
activism” or “slack-tivism.”30 Despite these unflattering monikers, social 
media has the power to influence agendas by the sheer number of people who 
post, comment, or blog about an issue. Budish believes that a form of activism 
between the two extremes should be cultivated to enhance the impact of 
activist movements.31 
II. CYBERATTACKS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
After discussing virtual activism, the Symposium participants turned to the 
use of cyber technology as an offensive and defense weapon. Are cyberattacks 
and state responses constrained by law, and if so, how? Panelists considered 
this question in light of three legal frameworks: jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and 
U.S. domestic law. 
A. Jus Ad Bellum 
The jus ad bellum framework applies to a state’s decision to resort to 
force.32 Two provisions of the UN Charter contain the foundation of jus ad 
bellum law. Article 2, paragraph 4 generally bans the “threat or use of force” 
against any other state.33 Article 51 explains that a state may respond in self-
defense to an “armed attack” against it.34 As a result, a state is in violation of 
international law when it engages in the “use of force” without justification, 
such as responding in self-defense to an “armed attack” under Article 51. 
 
 28 Meinrath, supra note 15. 
 29 Budish, supra note 19. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id.; see also Ryan Hal Budish, supra note 17. 
 32 Michael Schmitt, Chairman & Prof., Int’l Law Dep’t, U.S. Naval War Coll., Panel Discussion at the 
Emory International Law Review Symposium: International Law and the Internet (Feb. 1, 2012), http://www. 
youtube.com/watch?v=jDvP-z-f4tc. 
 33 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
 34 U.N. Charter art. 51. 
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Although the drafters of the U.N. Charter were in agreement that the phrase 
“use of force” should not be equated with “armed attack,”35 they did not define 
what constitutes a “use of force.”36 As a result, identifying a “use of force” is 
not always easy in the kinetic context, and only becomes more challenging 
when evaluating cyber activities.37 If left unresolved, this lack of lack of clarity 
could lead to unpredictable and erratic state responses to cyberattacks. 
In his keynote speech, Eric Greenwald, Senior Advisor to the Director of 
Operations at U.S. Cyber Command, pointed out that a “use of force” is clear 
where there is an obvious physical effect, such as the destruction of a 
generator.38 The key factor in determining whether a “use of force” occurred is 
the effect of the cyberattack.39 Col. Gary Brown, Staff Judge Advocate of U.S. 
Cyber Command, reminded the audience that information is constantly 
traveling through other countries, and such transit is not considered to rise to 
the level of a use of force.40 
Michael Schmitt, Chairman of the International Law Department at the 
U.S. Naval War College, suggested a practical approach for countries to use in 
determining whether an action constitutes a use of force: anticipate how the 
international community will characterize it.41 Certain factors can be 
employed, such as severity, measurability of the harm, and the invasiveness of 
the attack.42 
An armed attack, which could justify action in self-defense under 51, is a 
higher threshold than the “use of force” under Article 2, paragraph 4. An action 
that rises to the level of an “armed attack” under Article 51 severely damages 
 
 35 Schmitt, supra note 32 (noting that this interpretation was affirmed by the International Court of 
Justice). For a discussion of that case, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. 
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27), see infra text accompanying notes 87–88). 
 36 Id. 
 37 Eric Greenwald, Senior Advisor to the Dir. of Operations, U.S. Cyber Command, Keynote Speech at 
the Emory International Law Review Symposium: International Law and the Internet (Feb. 1, 2012), http:// 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=jDvP-z-f4tc. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id.; Catherine Lotrionte, Dir., Inst. for Law, Sci., & Global Sec., Georgetown Univ., Panel Discussion 
at the Emory International Law Review Symposium: International Law and the Internet (Feb. 1, 2012), http:// 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=jDvP-z-f4tc. 
 40 Col. Gary Brown, Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. Cyber Command, Panel Discussion at the Emory 
International Law Review Symposium: International Law and the Internet (Feb. 1, 2012), http://www.youtube. 
com/watch?v=jDvP-z-f4tc. 
 41 Schmitt, supra note 32. 
 42 Id. 
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property, injures people, or permanently interferes with system functionality.43 
Currently, the inquiry of whether an “armed attack” occurred also focuses on 
the effect of the action.44 Lotrionte suggests working toward an international 
consensus on certain targets which, if targeted, would trigger the existing 
framework for an “armed attack.”45 One possible area of agreement might be a 
country’s financial sector.46 Indeed, President Obama, in a recent speech, 
identified national assets that must be protected against cyber incursions.47 
Redefining “armed attack” to encompass a cyberattack on crucial parts of a 
country’s infrastructure may be one way that international law adapts to the 
challenges created by the Internet.48 
Further, all uses of force in self-defense require “necessity” and 
“proportionality.” These criteria are not contained in the UN Charter, but are 
instead part of customary law that international tribunals have confirmed are 
part of jus ad bellum law.49 The “necessity” requirement of jus ad bellum 
prohibits the use of force unless a threat or attack could not be addressed 
through non-forcible means.50 Responding with “proportionality” does not 
mean equivalent force; instead, it limits the amount of force used in self-
defense to what is reasonably necessary to stop the attack or threat of attack.51 
International tribunals have yet to rule on how these requirements can be met 
by states responding to a cyberattack.52 In the interim, states must use their best 
judgment as to whether an attack can be defended with a passive system like a 
firewall or if a more forcible response is needed to alleviate the threat.53 
Practically, the use of the Internet as the delivery mechanism makes it 
difficult to even identity the attacker against whom you may be able to act in 
self-defense. Attribution is difficult in the cyber context, as the attacking entity 
 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Lotrionte, supra note 39; see also Catherine Lotrionte, Sovereignty and Self-Defense in Cyberspace: A 
Normative Framework for Balancing Legal Rights, 26 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 825 (2012). 
 46 Lotrionte, supra note 39. 
 47 Eric Talbot Jensen, Assoc. Prof., Brigham Young Univ. Law Sch., Panel Discussion at the Emory 
International Law Review Symposium: International Law and the Internet (Feb. 1, 2012), http://www.youtube. 
com/watch?v=jDvP-z-f4tc; see also Eric Talbot Jensen, Cyber Deterrence, 26 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 773 
(2012). 
 48 Id. 
 49 Lotrionte, Sovereignty and Self-Defense in Cyberspace: A Normative Framework for Balancing Legal 
Rights, supra note 45, at 886. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
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can make it hard to determine who built and unleashed the malware.54 This 
challenge was exemplified by Stuxnet, as it took months for a consensus to 
form around the idea that the United States and Israel were responsible for its 
creation, and, to this date, neither country has officially admitted responsibility 
for deploying the cyber worm.55 
B. Jus In Bello 
Jus in bello, or international humanitarian law, applies during international 
and non-international armed conflict to limit the harmful impact of armed 
conflict on humanity.56 The jus in bello framework includes the Hague 
Conventions, which regulate military operations, and the Geneva Conventions, 
which provide protections for non-combatants, including prisoners of war and 
civilians.57 
Similar to the jus ad bellum framework, it is difficult to determine if and 
when cyber activities trigger certain provisions, which have been previously 
defined, if at all, in a kinetic context. For example, when do cyber actions can 
constitute an “armed conflict” that triggers the protections of international 
humanitarian law?58 It is unclear whether an “armed conflict” can be based 
solely on cyber activities.59 Schmitt and Lotrionte recommend a focus on the 
effects of the cyber activity,60 which usually requires harming people or 
infrastructure to rise to the level of “armed conflict.”61 
Further, it is an open question whether non-international armed conflict can 
be entirely virtual because it requires an organized armed group.62 Schmitt 
believes that it can be entirely virtual, so long as the group’s activities are well-
coordinated.63 Regardless, international humanitarian law will be difficult to 
apply. Because non-international armed conflicts must also rise to the level of 
 
 54 Lotrionte, supra note 39. 
 55 See supra text accompanying notes 1–5. 
 56 INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: ANSWERS TO YOUR 
QUESTIONS 14 (2004), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0703.pdf. 
 57 Id. at 4, 10–11. 
 58 Schmitt, supra note 32. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id.; Lotrionte, supra note 39. 
 61 Schmitt, supra note 32. 
 62 Id. Non-international armed conflict is contained within a single state. See INT’L COMM. OF THE RED 
CROSS, supra note 56, at 4. 
 63 See Schmitt, supra note 32. 
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protracted conflict, it may be more feasible to apply human rights and domestic 
laws to cyber actions contained within a single state.64 
Despite these challenges, existing jus in bello and jus ad bellum 
frameworks will likely be applied to cyber operations.65 It is highly improbable 
that the international community will reach consensus on new treaty provisions 
to govern cyber operations.66 As a result, several legal terms of art must be 
redefined so that they can be applied to this new forum for conflict.67 
C. Domestic Law and U.S. Military Strategy 
American policymakers are facing many of the same challenges integrating 
cyber operations into domestic policy.68 In the National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Congress, for the first time, explicitly authorized the 
military to conduct offensive operations in cyberspace.69 The relevant 
provisions, however, are very brief—fifty-five words to be exact:70 Section 
954 broadly authorizes cyber operations for the purpose of defending “our 
Nation, Allies and interests,” subject to the “legal regimes that the Department 
follows for kinetic capabilities, including the law of armed conflict.”71 As 
discussed in the previous subsections, it can be extremely difficult to apply 
parts of jus in bello and jus ad bellum law to cyber operations.72 
Although Congress is trying to create a regime to govern offensive cyber 
operations, Greenwald expects that the eventual result will be similar to covert 
operations.73 No country, including the United States, will agree to a detailed 
 
 64 Id. 
 65 Jensen, Cyber Deterrence, supra, note 47, at 792–823. 
 66 Schmitt, supra, note 32. 
 67 See Jensen, Cyber Deterrence, supra, note 47. 
 68 Greenwald, supra note 37. 
 69 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 954, 125 Stat. 1298, 
1551 (2011). 
 70 Id. The full text of section 954 reads: 
Congress affirms that the Department of Defense has the capability, and upon direction by the 
President may conduct offensive operations in cyberspace to defend our Nation, Allies and 
interests, subject to—(1) the policy principles and legal regimes that the Department follows for 
kinetic capabilities, including the law of armed conflict; and (2) the War Powers Resolution (50 
U.S.C. 1541 et seq.). 
Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 See supra Part II.A–B. 
 73 Greenwald, supra note 37. 
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governance structure because of the classified nature of the operations, as well 
as the fear of a double-edged sword: countries want to use cyber operations, 
but do not want to legitimate other countries using the same weapons against 
them.74 Instead, Greenwald anticipates that there will be a push for nation–
states to exercise greater control over online activity that takes place within 
their borders, which will make it easier to apply existing legal regimes, 
particularly with regard to attribution and state responsibility.75 
In addition, U.S. military operations cannot be conducted in violation of 
customary international law,76 and, therefore, cannot violate another country’s 
sovereignty.77 This raises an important question: How do we define a violation 
of sovereignty? As customary international law is developed through breach, 
we have to look to practice to determine its meaning in the cyber context.78 
Clearly, it is not a violation for data to travel through servers located in another 
country, which is different in kinetic operations where a state needs permission 
to intrude on another state’s terrain and airspace.79 It is hard to define at what 
point a digital incursion becomes a violation of sovereignty.80 Nevertheless, 
the United States must work to define that threshold so as to avoid being in 
violation of laws that apply to the U.S. military.81 
The U.S. military strategy of deterring cyberattacks also has to be 
considered in light of international law. There are many types of 
cyberdeterrence available to the United States, including invulnerability, 
invisibility, and interconnectedness.82 An actor can also be deterred by the 
threat of retaliation, which can be cyber, kinetic, or legal in nature.83 However, 
by signaling invulnerability, the United States could weaken its argument for 
necessity, which is required by international law in order to resort to use of 
 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. 
 77 See Directive No. 2311.01E: DoD Law of War Program, U.S. DEP’T DEF. 2 (May 9, 2006), http:// 
www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/231101e.pdf (requiring the U.S. military to comply with the “Law of 
War,” including customary international law) cited in 32 C.F.R. § 159.6 (2012). 
 78 Schmitt, supra note 32. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Brown, supra note 40. 
 81 Greenwald, supra note 37. 
 82 Jensen, Cyber Deterrence, supra note 47, at 806–23. 
 83 Id. 
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force in self-defense.84 Lotrionte argued that the requirement of necessity 
applies only to anticipatory self-defense.85 
Finally, deterrence becomes especially difficult in light of the attribution 
challenges created by the anonymous nature of many attacks.86 Lotrionte and 
Schmitt believe that the current standard of “effective control,” which the 
ICTY applied in Nicaragua v. United States to determine state responsibility,87 
will have to be loosened as a result of cyberattacks.88 Schmitt believes it will 
be replaced as state practice evolves.89 Lotrionte recommended the creation of 
a formal process for a state to follow in order to insulate itself from retaliation, 
which would include actions like admitting investigators from the state that 
suffered the cyberattack and making appropriate arrests.90 Such a proposal 
would require a new regulatory regime, although it may be easier to generate 
consensus in a situation where the rules are mainly procedural in nature. 
CONCLUSION 
While fitting cyber operations and activities neatly into international law is 
a challenging task, technology has forced legal regimes to adapt throughout 
history.91 Such reevaluation is apparent in areas as disparate as intellectual 
property and Fourth Amendment searches.92 It is difficult to enact laws that 
will not require modification in light of new technology: Broad laws are hard 
to apply, but narrow laws quickly become outdated.93 
Chellappa aptly framed the substantive questions at the intersection of 
international law and the Internet as another iteration of the age-old conflict 
 
 84 Jensen, Cyber Deterrence, supra note 47, at 807–813; Schmitt, supra note 33 (citing Caroline case of 
1837). 
 85 Lotrionte, supra note 39. 
 86 Jensen, Cyber Deterrence, supra note 47, at 785–87. 
 87 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 
14, 65 (June 27). 
 88 Lotrionte, supra note 39; Schmitt, supra note 32. 
 89 Schmitt, supra note 32. 
 90 Lotrionte, supra note 39. 
 91 Robert Schapiro, Interim Dean, Emory Univ. Sch. of Law, Introduction at the Emory International 
Law Review Symposium: International Law and the Internet (Feb. 1, 2012), http://youtu.be/jwO7yKFAprM. 
 92 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012) (holding that use of a GPS tracking device 
is a search, triggering Fourth Amendment protections); Amended Verdict Form at 15, Apple Inc. v. Samsung 
Elecs. Co., No. 11-CV-01846-LHK (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2012) (awarding nearly $1.05 billion to Apple for 
patent infringement claims against Samsung Electronics). 
 93 See Budish, supra note 19. 
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between liberty and security.94 As a society, we are constantly working to find 
the right balance between these two values in many different contexts. Faced 
with the challenges identified in the Symposium, we must strive to apply 
existing legal frameworks in a way that bolsters its role in education, 
communication, and innovation, while at the same time restricting its ability to 
cause harm and provoke international conflict. 
 
 
 94 Chellappa, supra note 20. 
